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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of 
N.A.M., A child under the 
age of eighteen years, 
Appellee. 
D.M. and A.M. 
Appellant. 
Case No. 981050-CA 
Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
Dennis and Amy Mace appeal from a final order of the 
Eighth District Juvenile Court, terminating their parental rights 
to N.A.M., pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 1997). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) (Supp. 1997) and § 78-3a-909 
(1996) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the juvenile court's conclusions of 
abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure of parental adjustment 
and token efforts are correct given the unchallenged findings of 
fact and supportive record evidence. 
Standard of Review; The precise standard of review 
applicable to this case appears to be a matter of first 
impression in this state. Appellants are correct in the basic 
proposition that the juvenile court's application of law to fact 
is reviewed by this Court for "correctness." State v. Pena, 869 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P. 2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994) . However, appellants omit to 
mention that the juvenile court is entitled to a degree of 
discretion in making the ultimate determination of whether a 
given set of facts supports the legal conclusion of unfitness. 
Id. However, the precise degree of discretion to be allowed in 
parental rights termination cases has not yet been definitively 
established.1 
Pena articulated several factors to be considered in 
determining what degree of discretion is warranted in any given 
case. Id. at 938-39. Applying these factors to the present 
case indicates that a substantial degree of discretion should be 
afforded to the juvenile court. First, the complicated factual 
scenario of this case warrants granting greater deference to the 
juvenile court's decision. Id.; see also State ex rel. M.L.. 965 
P.2d 551, 553 fn. 1 (Utah App. 1998)(noting parental rights 
termination cases are highly fact sensitive). Second, while 
there is a substantial body of law concerning parental rights 
terminations, the nature of these cases is such that there will 
never be an all-encompassing or definitive legal rule which 
1
 In several prior cases this Court has indicated that the 
juvenile court's legal conclusions of unfitness under the 
termination of Parental Rights Act are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. In re Adoption of B.O., 927 P.2d 202, 206 (Utah App. 
1996) (construing "token efforts" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
407); State ex rel. G.V., 916 P.2d 919, 920 (Utah App. 1993) 
(court's determination of abandonment reviewed for abuse of 
discretion); State ex rel. R.A.F., 863 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah App. 
1993)(construing abandonment under former Termination of Parental 
Rights Act and reviewing for abuse of discretion). Of these 
three cases, only B.O. was decided post-Pena. It is up to the 
appellate court's to establish legal standards, but trial courts 
should be granted considerable discretion in the application of 
facts to that standard. 
2 
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applies to every factual scenario. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39. 
Third, the juvenile court judge had the opportunity to observe 
the appearance and demeanor of these low functioning parents at 
trial which the record cannot hope to adequately reflect. Id/ 
Finally, because appellants have chosen to accept the 
factual findings of the juvenile court and are only making a 
legal challenge to their sufficiency, they are not entitled to 
distort those findings and the underlying evidence. Rather 
appellants must simply accept the juvenile court's findings and 
the evidence and reasonable inferences should only be entertained 
to the extent they support the court's ultimate conclusion. 
Labrum v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1983). 
2. Whether the juvenile court's finding regarding the 
father's inability to care for himself was supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
Standard of Review: In order to successfully challenge 
the juvenile court's findings, the parent must marshal the 
evidence supporting the findings and then show that the findings 
are so lacking in support that they are against the clear weight 
2
 Pena also indicated that, in some situations, there may be 
countervailing policy reasons for limiting the court's 
discretion. 869 P.2d at 939. In particular, the Court pointed 
to the determination of voluntariness of consent and found that 
the "varying fact patterns. . . were not so unmanageable in their 
variety as to outweigh the interest in having uniform legal 
rules." Id. As argued above, the possible fact patterns in 
parental abuse and neglect cases are virtually infinite and do 
not lend themselves well to fixed rules. Accordingly, while 
there are clearly important rights to be protected in these 
cases, the complicated and varying factual scenarios make it 
inappropriate to divest juvenile court judges of substantial 
discretion. 
3 
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of the evidence. State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
< 
3. Whether the juvenile court's finding regarding the 
number of parenting sessions attended by appellants was supported 
by sufficient evidence. 
i 
Standard of Review: In order to successfully challenge 
the juvenile court's findings, the parent must marshal the 
evidence supporting the findings and then show that the findings 
are so lacking in support that they are against the clear weight 
of the evidence. State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah 
App. 1997) . 
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 1997). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-408 (Supp. 1997). i 
(Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS") 
petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Dennis and Amy 
Mace to N.A.M. on or about May 8, 1997. (R. 105-11). Trial on i 
the petition was held October 28-29, 1997 before Eighth District 
Juvenile Court Judge Scott N. Johanson. The juvenile court 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order i 
Terminating Parental Rights on December 1, 1997, which order 
terminated the Maces1 rights to N.A.M. (R. 402-17; Addendum B). 
4 
\ 
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The Maces filed a Notice of Appeal on December 31, 1997. (R. 
421-22). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dennis Mace ("father") and Amy Mace ("mother") are the 
natural parents of N.A.M, a female child, born April 22, 1996. 
(R. 403). 
A referral was made to DCFS by hospital personnel 
shortly after N.A.M.'s birth, alleging, among other things, that 
the mother was not bonding to the infant and would not feed her. 
There was also a concern that the parents did not have the 
ability to care for the baby's heart problem which required the 
use of a heart monitor. (R. 2-3, 403-04, 465 at 46-47) . 
N.A.M. was taken into DCFS custody on April 24, 1996. 
The parents admitted to the allegations contained in the State's 
Verified Petition on June 5, 1996. The juvenile court, on that 
date, ordered that N.A.M. be returned home under an order of 
protective supervision. (R. 33-38, 404). 
N.A.M. was readmitted to the hospital the same day as 
adjudication. Hospital staff refused to release N.A.M. to her 
parents until they had been properly trained in CPR and use of 
the heart monitor. (R. 404). 
N.A.M. was taken into DCFS custody for a second time on 
June 10, 1996, and another Verified Petition was filed by the 
State on June 12, 1996 alleging that the parents (1) failed to 
attend all the offered training related to use of the heart 
5 
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1 
monitor, (2) that they were not proficient enough in CPR and 
operation of the heart monitor to safely care for the child, (3) 
that the mother lacked the knowledge to safely care for her child 
in the event of an emergency even after a CPR lesson, and (4) 
that they did not visit the child for two full days. A combined 
shelter, adjudication, and dispositional hearing took place on 
June 12, 1996. DCFS was awarded custody of the child but she was 
ordered to be returned to the parents as soon as they became 
proficient in CPR and use of the heart monitor. (R. 15-20, 40-
45, 404). 
DCFS prepared a court-ordered service plan which the 
1 
parents signed on July 10, 1996. The parents were required to 1) 
visit the child as often as possible, 2) secure a home 
appropriate for a newborn infant, and 3) demonstrate appropriate 
skills to care for N.A.M. (Exh. #3). 
With regard to visitation, it occurred fairly regularly 
between June and August 1996. DCFS lost contact with the parents 
toward the end of August 1996. There was no visitation between 
August 27 and December 18, 1996, because the parents didn't 
request any and their whereabouts were unknown. (R. 406-07, 465 
at 70, 79). The DCFS caseworker made extraordinary efforts to 
find the parents and encourage them to visit N.A.M. and work on 
their service plan during these months. (R. 465 at 70-71, 73-74, 
76, 79, 155) . 
Between June and December 1996, the parent's living 
arrangements were unsatisfactory to DCFS. They were either 
6 
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living with relatives or friends who were not acceptable due to 
prior substantiated sex abuse referrals, or in homes which did 
not meet the basic minimum standards for cleanliness. The 
parents did obtain suitable housing in mid-December 1996. (R. 
406, 465 at 115-17, 127, 151). 
With regard to the third requirement of the service 
plan, a peer-parent was assigned to the parents on June 12, 1996, 
the day the second petition was adjudicated, to teach them 
parenting skills. The peer-parent worked intensively with the 
Maces between June and August 1996, spending 20 days in the home, 
but felt they exhibited a lack of love, concern, attachment, and 
desire to parent N.A.M. The peer-parent was also concerned that 
the parents were not retaining what they had been taught. (R. 
404-06, 466 at 326, 329). There was also a dispute over whether 
the mother and the father passed the required medical training 
for N.A.M. (R. 406, 465 at 62). 
Psychological evaluations were completed on both 
parents, during the time the first service plan was in effect, in 
May 1996. Although the mother was found to have various 
problems, such as lack of insight, the evaluation indicated she 
had the cognitive ability to learn parenting skills. (R. 466 at 
304; Exh. #7). The father, however was found to be mildly 
mentally retarded and lacking the cognitive abilities to care for 
a child without significant assistance. His score on the Global 
Assessment of Functioning Scale was very low at 30. The score of 
an average functioning person is between 65 and 80. Such a low 
7 
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score indicated significant pathologies and concerns about the 
father's ability to function. Mr. Mace was given several 
diagnoses, including a personality disorder with schizotypal 
features. (R. 282-88, 407, 466 at 312, 319; Exh. #6). 
Because the parents had made very little progress on 
the first service plan, a second was issued on or about January 
1, 1997. (R. 408, 465 at 237; Exh. # 3). The second plan was 
more specific and easy to understand. The caseworker went over 
the plan's requirements very carefully with the parents to ensure 
they understood what was expected of them and the urgency of 
completing it immediately. The second plan required the parents 
to 1) enroll in parenting classes, 2) maintain appropriate 
housing, 3) attend visits with N.A.M. and take an active role in 
her care and progress, and 4) explore occupational and 
educational opportunities and plan financially for self 
sufficiency. (R. 408-09; Exh. #3). 
During the first three months of the second service 
plan, the parents failed to enroll in parenting classes, as 
required, even though everything had been arranged by DCFS. (R. 
409, 465 at 208, 238, 252-53). 
The parents did maintain appropriate housing during the 
period the second treatment plan was in effect. (R. 409, 465 at 
238) . 
Peer parenting resumed at the commencement of the 
second service plan, but had to be started at the beginning 
because the parents had retained nothing from the previous 
8 
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sessions. (R. 409, 466 at 340). The peer parent saw no 
improvement in the Maces' parenting skills during this treatment 
plan and felt they were just going through the motions. The 
parents seemed uncomfortable during visits and acted relieved 
when they were over. (R. 410, 466 at 345, 352, 372). The Maces 
missed approximately half of the visits offered them between 
January and April of 1997, (R. 408-410). 
Finally, the parents did nothing to explore 
occupational or educational opportunities during the second 
service plan, even though they admitted to having extreme 
financial problems. (R. 465 at 242, 466 at 366). 
In March of 1997, a bonding assessment was conducted on 
N.A.M., the Maces, and the foster parents. The assessment 
concluded there was no significant bond between N.A.M. and her 
natural parents, and that the Maces lacked the basic parenting 
skills necessary to care for the emotional and physical well-
being of their child. Conversely, the baby exhibited a secure, 
healthy, normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents, 
with whom she has resided since her birth. (R. 410, 466 at 389) . 
The juvenile court terminated reunification services to 
the parents at the 12-month dispositional hearing on April 23, 
1997. (R. 88-90). DCFS filed a petition for termination of 
parental rights on or about May 8, 1997. (R. 105-11). 
Trial on the parental deprivation petition was held on 
October 28 and 29, 1997. The juvenile court entered its 
Memorandum Decision on November 6, 1997. Findings of Fact, 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Conclusions of Law, and Order Terminating Parental Rights were 
prepared from that memorandum decision and entered on December 1, 
1997. The parental rights of Dennis and Amy Mace were terminated 
to N.A.M. on grounds of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, out-of-
home placement, failure of parental adjustment, token efforts, 
and best interests. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 1997). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants challenge most, but not all, of the juvenile 
court's conclusion of law supporting the termination of their 
parental rights. However, they do not challenge the pertinent 
findings of fact underlying the challenged conclusions of law. 
The parents either argue that none of the findings support the 
conclusions or that the existing findings do not justify reaching 
a particular conclusion of law. 
Appellants claims are all without merit because they 
ignore the pertinent findings of fact that form a basis for each 
conclusion. Furthermore, the parents apparently accept the 
findings of fact because they do not challenge their sufficiency, 
except two limited instances. Given the court's findings that 
the parents (1) lost interest in their child, (2) failed to visit 
or communicate for significant periods of time, (3) failed to 
learn appropriate parenting skills despite provision of diligent 
services, (4) failed to avail themselves of services, and (5) 
were either unable or unwilling to make significant changes in 
their parenting deficiencies, the juvenile court correctly 
10 
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reached conclusions of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure 
of parental adjustment and token efforts. 
Finally, appellants do challenge the court's findings 
of fact regarding their lack of attendance at one session of 
parenting classes and the father's inability to care for himself. 
Even if these findings were clearly erroneous, overturning them 
would not change the outcome. However, because appellants 
failed to meet their burden of marshalling the evidence, and 
thereby ignored the sufficient evidence supporting the findings, 
this Court should affirm the findings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY REACHED ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF ABANDONMENT, NEGLECT, 
UNFITNESS, FAILURE OF PARENTAL ADJUSTMENT AND 
TOKEN EFFORTS BASED ON THE COURT'S 
UNCHALLENGED FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The Maces argue that the juvenile court's conclusions 
of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure of parental 
adjustment and token efforts have no support in the court's 
findings of fact and, therefore, the order terminating their 
parental rights should be reversed. Appellants apparently accept 
the underlying findings of fact - with the exception of two 
findings which are irrelevant to the arguments below - because 
they do not mount a sufficiency challenge.3 Instead, the Maces 
3
 In order to challenge sufficiency the Maces would bear the 
burden of marshalling the evidence which they have not even 
attempted to do. See State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 
(Utah App. 1997). 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
choose to challenge the correctness of the juvenile court's legal 
conclusions while accepting the underlying findings. 
Moreover, although appellants challenge most of the 
grounds for termination of their parental rights, they do not 
challenge every ground relied upon by the juvenile court. For 
example, the juvenile court relied upon the ground identified in 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-3a-407(4), which is the failure of the 
parents to remedy their circumstances while the child is in an 
out-of-home placement. (R. 412-13). The Maces do not attempt to 
challenge this basis for termination. 
This Court can affirm the parental termination order on 
any separate, independent ground found by the juvenile court. 
E.g. State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1997). 
Thus, even assuming the court erred in terminating parental 
rights based on some of the other statutory grounds, the parental 
termination order can be affirmed on the unchallenged ground 
under section 78-3a-407 (4). However, as demonstrated below, the 
juvenile court correctly reached all its conclusions that the 
additional statutory grounds for termination had been proven as 
well. 
A. The Juvenile Court Correctly Concluded 
Appellants Abandoned Their Child, 
The Maces challenge the juvenile court's legal 
conclusion that they abandoned N.A.M. In support of this 
argument, they assert that (1) no findings support the 
abandonment conclusion, (2) their conduct does not meet the 
12 
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statutory criteria for abandonment, and (3) their conduct was not 
as "outrageous" as the conduct depicted in prior case law. 
(Appellant's Br. at 15-18). 
The Termination of Parental Rights Act provides that a 
prima facie case of abandonment is proven when the parents have 
"failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural parent 
without just cause." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-408 (1) (c) (Supp. 
1997). Utah Courts have recognized that the statutory 
definitions of abandonment are supplemented by a two-part test: 
Abandonment consists of conduct on the part 
of the parent which implies [1] a conscious 
disregard of the obligations owed by a parent 
to the child, [2] leading to the destruction 
of the parent-child relationship. 
See State ex rel. G.V., 916 P.2d 918, 920-21 (Utah App. 1996) 
(Utah courts required to apply two part test in determining 
whether the child has been abandoned); State ex rel. M.S. v. 
Lochner, 815 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah courts have continually found that parents' 
failure to regularly visit their children and their failure to 
even write letters or make phone calls is sufficient to meet both 
prongs of the abandonment test. See G.V., 916 P.2d at 920-21; 
see also State ex rel. E.R., 918 P.2d 162 (Utah App. 1996); State 
ex rel. M.S. v. Lochner, 815 P.2d 1325 (Utah App. 1991); In re 
J.P.M., 808 P.2d 1122 (Utah App. 1991). 
Contrary to the appellants' assertions, the juvenile 
court's unchallenged findings regarding their conduct supports 
both the statutory and the case law criteria for abandonment. 
13 
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After N.A.M. was removed from their care twice due to their 
inability to care for her in April and June of 1996, the Maces 
began to lose interest in her by August of 1996 - a mere two 
months after the second removal. 
They began to disengage and absent themselves from the 
peer parenting sessions and visitation with the child. (R. 406; 
1 I.). They disappeared and failed to request visits with their 
child for nearly four months beginning in late August, and failed 
to contact or communicate with DCFS about their child during the 
same time period. (R. 406-07; ^ K. and L.). The Maces also 
missed approximately one-half of the scheduled visits in March 
and April of 1997. (R. 410; H U.). 
On April 24, 1997, the juvenile court terminated DCFS's 
obligation to provide reunification services, and from that date 
until the trial in October the Maces did not attempt to visit or 
communicate with their child. (R. 410-11; f V.). 
Based upon the foregoing unchallenged findings, the 
juvenile court correctly concluded that the Maces conduct met the 
legal criteria for abandonment. 
B. The Juvenile Court Concluded Ms, Mace 
Neglected Her Child, 
The Maces next argue that the juvenile court erred in 
concluding that Ms. Mace neglected N.A.M. They again assert 
that no findings support this conclusion of law supporting 
termination. They further claim that no statutory circumstances 
14 
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were proven under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-408(2). (Appellant's 
Br. at 18-20). 
The juvenile court concluded that Ms. Mace had 
neglected N.A.M. by her "repeated or continuous failure to 
provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, 
education or other care necessary for the physical, mental and 
emotional health and development of the child" despite her 
ability to provide such care. (R. 411; H B.); see Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-408(2) (d) (Supp. 1997). 
The court's unchallenged findings demonstrate that, 
although her evaluation showed her capable of providing such 
care, Ms. Mace lost interest in her child, abdicated to others 
her responsibility for caring for the child, failed to obtain 
appropriate housing for a lengthy period of time, and failed to 
avail herself of services designed to assist her in learning 
appropriate parenting skills as well as services necessary for 
providing direct care to her child (i.e., WIC program). (R. 405-
410; %% F. , I., J., K., L., R., S., and U.). Based on these 
unchallenged findings, the juvenile court correctly concluded 
under section 78-3a-408(2) that Ms. Mace neglected N.A.M.4 
C. The Juvenile Court Correctly Concluded 
Mr, Mace Is Unfit To Parent His Child, 
The Maces also challenge the juvenile court's 
conclusion of unfitness. Although they challenge the finding as 
4
 The court's conclusions reference section 78-3a-407(2) as 
the actual ground for termination, but section -408(2) is the 
type of evidence necessary to prove the ground for termination. 
15 
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to both Mr. and Ms. Mace, the juvenile court only found unfitness 
as to Mr. Mace. (R. 412). The Maces claim the unfitness 
conclusion is incorrect because (1) no findings support the 
conclusion; (2) N.A.M. was originally removed from them based on 
dependency rather than any fault-based type of conduct; (3) Mr. 
Mace was capable of learning to care for N.A.M. with Ms. Mace's 
help; and (4) they both technically complied with certain aspects 
of the treatment plan. (Appellant's Br. at 20-23). 
The juvenile court concluded that Mr. Mace is unfit due 
to a mental deficiency that "renders him unable to care for the 
immediate and continuous physical or emotional needs of the child 
for an extended period of time." (R. 412). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-408 (2) (a) (Supp. 1997),. Given the clear evidence 
supporting the court's conclusion of unfitness, appellants 
arguments regarding the reasons for N.A.M.'s initial removal and 
Mr. Mace's limited compliance with some aspects of a service plan 
are irrelevant. The real concern in the court's view is Mr. 
Mace's fundamental inability to parent N.A.M. due to his mental 
deficiencies. 
The Mace's claims that no findings support the 
unfitness conclusion and that Mr. Mace is capable of learning to 
care for N.A.M. are also without merit. The juvenile court's 
unchallenged findings demonstrate that despite DCFS's diligent 
services - including intensive daily parenting training for the 
few months the Maces would accept this service - Mr. Mace was 
unable to retain anything he was taught and he lacked the basic 
cognitive abilities to care for a child. (R. 405-410; *h*h F., G., 
16 
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H., I., M., S.; and U.; see also Psychological Evaluation of Mr. 
Mace, State's Exh. #6; R. 466 at 304-05 (testimony of 
evaluator)) .5 
Based on these unchallenged findings, the juvenile 
court correctly concluded that Mr. Mace is unfit. See State ex 
rel. W.D.,111 v. W.M.. 856 P.2d 363 (Utah App. 1993) (upholding 
termination of parental rights on grounds of unfitness where 
father with psychological problems was unlikely to resolve his 
parenting deficiencies in the future despite services provided by 
state); State ex rel. C.Y. v. Yates, 764 P.2d 251 (Utah App. 
1988) (upholding termination of parental rights based upon 
unfitness where no significant improvement in parenting skills 
occurred despite the father's attempt to complete court-ordered 
treatment plan). 
D. The Juvenile Court Correctly Concluded 
Appellants Experienced A Failure Of Parental 
Adjustment, 
The Maces challenge the juvenile court's conclusion of 
failure of parental adjustment because they claim they resolved 
5
 The psychological evaluation, upon which the court's 
conclusion is based, states: 
It would appear that intellectual dysfunction would 
likely prohibit [Mr. Mace] from being able to 
adequately care for his child. 
It appears unlikely that [Mr. Mace] would be able to 
adequately care for his child without considerable 
assistance. He appears to lack the cognitive skills 
and motivation to provide for the needs of a young 
infant and seemed to minimize the importance of the 
evaluation process in determining his ability to do so. 
(State's Exh. #6, p. 5). 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
the circumstances that led to N.A.M.'s out-of-home placement and, 
therefore, the statutory criteria had not been met. 
Specifically, they claim the only reasons for out-of-home * 
placement were their inadequate housing and lack of certification 
for N.A.M.'s heart monitor. (Appellant's Br. at 23-25). Their 
arguments are not accurate. { 
To terminate parental rights based on failure of 
parental adjustment, the court must determine the following 
criteria have been met: ( 
'Failure of parental adjustment' means that a 
parent or parents are unable or unwilling 
within a reasonable time to substantially 
correct the circumstances, conduct, or 
conditions that led to placement of their i 
child outside of their home, notwithstanding 
reasonable and appropriate efforts made by 
the Division of Child and Family Services to 
return the child to that home. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-403(2) (Supp. 1997). ( 
The juvenile court interpreted this statutory language 
as including, not only the circumstances that led to the initial 
removal, but also any circumstances which developed during the { 
placement which prevented the child from returning home. (R. 
413). The court's interpretation is reasonable under the plain 
language of the statute given that the "circumstances" leading to * 
out of home placement include any parenting deficiencies creating 
those circumstances.6 
6
 The Maces' interpretation of the statute could conceivably, 
require the juvenile court to preserve the parental rights of 
unfit parents merely because they were unfit for a reason other 
that which initially warranted removal. 
18 
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Even assuming the juvenile court's interpretation is 
incorrect, the Maces claim the only circumstances leading to 
removal were lack of housing and lack of certification for the 
heart monitor. This is incorrect. Contrary to their claim, 
there were many other circumstances that led to removal: lack of 
bonding, failure to feed the child, and lack of interest in 
visiting the child after the first removal. 
These circumstances were listed in both the state's 
petitions, and were admitted to by both parents. (R. 1-5, 15-20, 
33-34, 40-41) . Arguably, the real circumstances leading to 
removal were the parents' lack of interest in their child - a 
circumstance that ultimately resulted in the parents failing to 
comply with treatment plans. Given all the circumstances that 
led to removal, the juvenile court correctly concluded that the 
Maces experienced a "failure of parental adjustment" because they 
failed to correct those circumstances within a reasonable time 
despite reasonable efforts by DCFS. See State ex rel. G.D., 894 
P.2d 1278 (Utah App. 1995) (upholding termination of parental 
rights based upon ground of failure of parental adjustment). 
E. The Juvenile Court Concluded Appellants 
Made Only Token Efforts To Be Reunified With 
Their Child, 
The Maces also challenge the juvenile court's 
conclusion that they "made only token efforts and in some cases 
no effort at all to support or communicate with the child, to 
eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional 
abuse, or to avoid being unfit in accordance with 78-3a-407 (6) ." 
19 
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(Appellant's Br. at 25-26; R. 413). In support of this 
challenge, the Maces claim that they made many efforts, and also 
that their conduct is not so egregious as the conduct of other { 
parents. (Appellant's Br. at 26). 
As noted above in Section A., there are ample 
unchallenged findings and evidence to support a conclusion of ( 
abandonment. (R. 406-07, 410-11; M I., K., L., U-, V.). These 
same findings, in addition to findings that show noncompliance 
with important aspects of treatment plans, demonstrate that the ( 
Maces efforts were only token. 
Even assuming the Maces made some significant efforts 
at times, it is important to recognize that at a critical time in ( 
the development of the bond with their infant child — two months 
after her placement in state custody as a 2-month old infant and 
after overnight visitation had begun - the Maces disappeared for ( 
almost 4 months. This disappearance was certain to destroy any 
progress in bonding that had been made. Then after only two 
months of sporadic visitation, the Maces missed many more visits ( 
and then stopped requesting visits entirely. Based on these 
unchallenged findings, in addition to the fact that they were 
going through the motions of compliance without making any { 
significant progress, the juvenile court correctly concluded that 
the Maces made only token efforts. 
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II. THE FINDING OF FACT REGARDING THE 
FATHER'S INABILITY TO CARE FOR HIMSELF IS NOT 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND MOREOVER IS IRRELEVANT 
TO THE DETERMINATION OF THIS APPEAL. 
The Maces take issue with the juvenile court's finding 
of fact which states: 
M. Psychological assessments had been 
completed on both parents, the conclusions of 
which were that while the father lacked the 
cognitive abilities to care for himself 
without adult assistance, let alone care for 
and protect a baby, the mother was capable of 
learning parenting skills. 
(R. 407). Appellants claim this finding is clearly erroneous 
because there is no support in the record for the finding that 
Mr. Mace lacked the ability to care for himself. 
Contrary to the Maces' claims, there is evidence in the 
record to support that portion of the finding and they have 
failed to marshal this evidence as required when asserting error 
in a court's factual findings. See State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 
P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1997). Becky Valcarce, one of the 
evaluators who performed the psychological evaluation on Mr. 
Mace, testified that his score on the Global Assessment of 
Functioning "would indicate some significant pathologies and some 
concerns regarding ability to function physically and 
psychologically and socially." (R. 466 at 319). 
In addition, the evaluation, admitted as State's 
Exhibit 6 without objection (R. 466 at 301), states, on page 5, 
that the "results of [Mr. Mace's] intellectual/academic testing 
suggested that he should experience significant difficulty in 
comprehending and meeting the intellectual demands of his day-to-
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day and occupational functioning." The evaluation also states, 
at page 6, that Mr. Mace "should be provided services through a 
program for mentally retarded individuals to assist him in ( 
learning adaptive behavior skills related to independent living, 
such as self care and home care." Given this record evidence, 
the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Mace ( 
lacked the cognitive ability to care for himself. 
However, even assuming the juvenile court did err in 
entering this finding, the error is harmless because the relevant i 
issue for this appeal is whether Mr. Mace has the ability to care 
for his child. The Maces do not challenge that portion of the 
court's finding relating to his inability to care for N.A.M., i 
and, therefore, any error, if one exists, is harmless because it 
cannot affect the outcome of the proceedings. See State ex 
rel. J.C. v. Cruz, 808 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Utah App. 1991); State in ( 
re M.M.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah App. 1995). 
III. THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 
THAT APPELLANTS ATTENDED FIVE OUT OF SIX { 
PARENTING CLASSES IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The Maces' final challenge is a claim that the juvenile 
court clearly erred in finding that they attended five of six < 
parenting classes. (R. 410; U U.). Appellants specifically 
assert that the record demonstrates they attended six sessions, 
not five. (Appellantfs Br. at 28-30). Given the Maces overall < 
dismal failure, it is not clear why they place such importance on 
this fact. Nonetheless, their argument is without merit. 
The evidence regarding how many parenting sessions were
 ( 
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held is confusing at best. The parenting class instructor 
initially testified that the parents followed through with eight 
sessions, and had one more session to finish but were unable to 
do so. (T. 466 at 414). She later testified that she 
consolidated her 12-week class into six weeks. (T. 466 at 420). 
The only clear fact the parenting instructor testified to was 
that the parents did not finish the last session. Appellants 
failed to adequately marshal this evidence as required when 
making a sufficiency challenge. See State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 
P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 1997). Given this record evidence, the 
court did not clearly err in finding the parents attended five of 
six sessions. 
Moreover, even if the juvenile court erred, the error 
is harmless. Any variance regarding the number of parenting 
classes attended clearly would not change the outcome of this 
case, given that the Maces did not challenge the findings 
regarding their failure to learn appropriate parenting skills 
over an 11 month period of time, irrespective of the number of 
classes attended. See State ex rel. J.C. v. Cruz, 808 P.2d 
1131, 1136 (Utah App. 1991); State in re M.M.J., 908 P.2d 345, 
349 (Utah App. 1995). 
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
The State does not request oral argument or a published 
opinion in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the juvenile court's 
order terminating appellants' parental rights to N.A.M. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j2.^ da^ o f AP r i 1/ 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
CAROL L. C. VE^DOIA 
Assistant Attorney General 
( 
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78-3a-407 JUDICIAL CODE 434 
78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental rights. 
The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if it finds any one of the following: 
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the 
child; 
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused 
the child; 
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent; 
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home 
placement under the supervision of the court or the 
division, that the division or other responsible agency has 
made a diligent effort to provide appropriate services and 
the parent has substantially neglected, wilfully refused, 
or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circum-
stances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home 
placement, and there is a substantial likelihood that the 
parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effec-
tive parental care in the near future; 
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this 
chapter; 
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the 
parent or parents: 
(a) to support or communicate with the child; 
(b) to prevent neglect of the child; 
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, men-
tal, or emotional abuse of the child; or 
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent; 
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished 
their parental rights to the child, and the court finds that 
termination is in the child's best interest; or 
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during 
which the child was returned to live in his own home, 
substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or 
failed to give the child proper parental care and protec-
tion. 1994 
78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination. 
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have aban-
doned a child, it is prima facie evidence of abandonment that 
the parent or parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have 
surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period 
of six months following the surrender have not manifested 
to the child or to the person having the physical custody of 
the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to 
make arrangements for the care of the child; 
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail, 
telephone, or otherwise for six months; or 
(c) failed to have shown the normal interest of a natu-
ral parent, without just cause. 
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or 
have neglected a child the court shall consider, but is not 
limited to, the following conditions: 
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental defi-
ciency of the parent that renders him unable to care for 
the immediate and continuing physical or emotional 
needs of the child for extended periods of time; 
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, 
or sexually cruel or abusive nature; 
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, 
controlled substances, or dangerous drugs that render the 
parent unable to care for the child; 
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child 
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other 
care necessary for his physical, mental, and emotional 
health and development by a parent or parents who are 
capable of providing that care. However, a parent who, 
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, does not pro-
vide specified medical treatment for a child is not for that 
reason alone a negligent or unfit parent; 
(e) with regard to a child who is in the custody of the 
division, if the parent is incarcerated as a result of 
conviction of a felony, and the sentence is of such length 
that the child will be deprived of a normal home for more 
than one year; or 
(f) a history of violent behavior. 
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division 
and the parent or parents fail to comply substantially with the 
terms and conditions of a plan within six months after the 
date on which the child was placed or the plan was com-
menced, whichever occurs later, that failure to comply is 
evidence of failure of parental adjustment. 
(4) The following circumstances constitute prima facie evi-
dence of unfitness: 
(a) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a sibling of the 
child due to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by 
the parent or parents; 
(b) conviction of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of 
such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to 
provide adequate care to the extent necessary for the 
child's physical, mental, or emotional health and develop-
ment; or 
(c) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely dis-
abling injury to or disfigurement of the child. iw 
78-3a-409. Specific considerations where child is not 
in physical custody of parent. 
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or 
parents, the court, in determining whether parental rights 
should be terminated shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and 
needs of the child and his desires regarding the termina-
tion, if the court determines he is of sufficient capacity to 
express his desires; and 
(b) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust 
their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in 
the child's best interest to return him to his home after a 
reasonable length of time, including but not limited to: 
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute 
physical care and maintenance, if financially able; 
(ii) maintenance of regular visitation or other con-
tact with the child that was designed and carried out 
in a plan to reunite the child with the parent or 
parents; and 
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communi-
cation with the custodian of the child. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard 
incidental conduct, contributions, contacts, and communica-
tions. i*7 
78-3a-410. Specific considerations where a child hai 
been placed in foster home. 
If a child is in the custody of the division and has been 
placed and resides in a foster home and the division institute 
proceedings under this part regarding the child, with au 
ultimate goal of having the child's foster parent or paren'J 
adopt him, the court shall consider whether the child hai 
become integrated into the foster family to the extent that hJ 
familial identity is with that family, and whether the fos^ 
family is able and willing permanently to treat the child as a 
member of the family. The court shall also consider, but is o* 
limited to, the following: 
(1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties exUtinf 
between the child and the parents, and the child's tai 
with the foster family; 
(2) the capacity and disposition of the child's parent* 
from whom the child was removed as compared with ttJj 
of the foster family to give the child love, affection. v» 
guidance and to continue the education of the child: 
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Edwin T. Peterson #3849 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorney for State of Utah 
140 West 425 South (330-15) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Telephone: (801) 722-6546 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the interest of: 
MACE, Nicole Ann 04/22/96 
A person(s) under 18 years of age. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION S OF LAW AND ORDER 
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Case No. 909850 
Judge: Scott N. Johanson 
This matter came before the Honorable Scott N. Johanson for trial on the State of Utah's 
Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights with respect to the parental rights of Dennis 
Mace and Amy Opshal Mace to the above-named Child on the 28th and 29th day of October, 
1997 at 9:30 a.m. Edwin T. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the 
State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"). William McCairns was present 
as the representative of DCFS. Cleve Hatch appeared as the Guardian ad Litem for the above-
referenced child (the "Child"). Patricia Geary was present representing Dennis Mace and Amy 
r~ 
DEC - I 1997 
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Page 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Nicole Ann Mace 
to a heart monitor. The child was taken into custody on April 24, 1996 and a petition for custody 
filed by DCFS was adjudicated on June 5, 1996. 
B. The court returned the child to the parents under Protective Supervision. The child 
was hospitalized on June 5 and hospital staff refused to release her to her parents until the parents 
were trained in CPR and in the operation of the heart monitor. 
C. Because the parents did not avail themselves of the necessary training, a new petition 
was filed on June 10 seeking custody be placed with DCFS. 
D. The baby was taken into protective custody on June 10 for the second time pursuant 
to this second petition. Up to that time she had been in DCFS custody or in the hospital but never 
in the parent's custody. Temporary custody was granted by the court on June 12, 1996, after 
which DCFS began to implement a reunification plan which consisted of visitation between the 
parents and the baby as often as possible, establishment of a home appropriate for a newborn, 
having the parents learn parenting skills, CPR skills and heart and breath monitor skills. 
E. While this written treatment plan was very poorly drafted, almost devoid of the 
specificity necessary to be understood and carried out by low functioning parents, nevertheless 
DCFS made diligent efforts to provide services. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Nicole Ann Mace 
I. Through June, July and August of 1996, the parents passed the monitor training and 
visits were fairly regular. However, as time went on, the aunt, with whom the parents were 
living, began to handle the baby during visits, and on some occasions the parents weren't even 
present. When they were present the peer parent was frustrated that basic parenting skills had to 
be taught over and over again at each visit because the parents weren't retaining what they had 
been taught. 
J. The parent's living arrangements were unacceptable to DCFS because they were 
living with various relatives or others who were either unacceptable themselves because of prior 
substantiated sex abuse referrals or who's homes did not meet basic minimum standards of 
cleanliness. The family received attention from DCFS in one form or another on 33 different days 
from June 12 to August 30. 
K. In late August the parents appeared to begin to lose interest in the baby. The parents 
accepted the responsibility of requesting further visits. Visits became sporadic and then ceased. 
The parents continued to have unstable living arrangements. At one point DCFS and the parents' 
attorney lost track of the parents altogether because of their moving. They told the peer parent 
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the foster family. The foster home was stable and satisfactory. The baby was ahead 
developmental^ and had outgrown the need for the heart and breath monitor. She recognized the 
foster parents as fulfilling the roles of parents in her life. 
0. A second reunification treatment plan was implemented with a beginning date of 
January 1, 1997, although the signatures bear the date of February 6, 1997. This treatment plan 
had more detail than the first one and therefore it was more easily understood and helpful to the 
parents. Visitation was still the key factor in reunification with the first four visits specified to 
be held at the DCFS office for one hour, all to be completed within four weeks. Thereafter the 
visits were allowed in the parents' home and could be longer. Transportation and cancellation 
policies were clear, as was designation of who could be present, and who was to supervise the 
visits. 
P. In addition, parenting classes were required, as well as appropriate housing, peer 
parenting, and a vague requirement to "explore occupational and educational opportunities" and 
to "plan financially for their family and work towards self-sufficiency." 
Q. Visits were re-established for December 23 but the parents' attorney failed to notify 
the parents and the first visit since August was January 2, 1997. Visits on January 16 and January 
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T. In March a bonding assessment evaluation was conducted on the baby, the parents 
and the foster parents by the Family and Attachment Center, the conclusion of which was that 
there was no significant bond between the baby and the parents and that the parents lacked the 
basic parenting skills necessary to care for her emotional and physical well-being. Conversely 
the baby exhibited secure healthy and normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents. 
U. Also in March a second parenting class was offered to the parents. They failed to 
attend any of the classes but did attend five of six sessions arranged independent of DCFS by the 
parents' attorney with the attorney's sister, who had taught parenting classes in the past. The 
parents missed approximately one-half of the scheduled visits with the baby in March and April. 
On some of those visits the parents showed up late after the baby and the foster parents had left. 
Peer parenting continued through April with no significant change in parenting skills. The baby 
was treating the visits as visits with strangers or at best acquaintances, but not as parents, with 
some increasing anxiety and some sleep loss after the visits. The parents seemed uncomfortable 
and relieved to get the visits over with. 
V. The court terminated the DCFS obligation to attempt to reunify the family on April 
24,1997. Since that time there has been no visitation or other communication between the parents 
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C. The father is unfit or incompetent within the meaning of 78-3a-407(3) in that his 
mental deficiency renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuous physical or 
emotional needs of the child for an extended period of time. 
D. This child has been in an out of home placement since birth, and DCFS for a period 
of 12 months made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services. The parents neglected, 
refused or were unwilling or unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out of home 
placement. The court notes that the 78-3a-407(4) does not require that the circumstances to be 
remedied are those which caused the original removal. Rather the statute requires the remedying 
of the circumstances that cause out of home placement. In other words, the causes of the out of 
home placement are fluid as dangers to the child change while the child is in out of home 
placement. While the primary cause of the original removal was the need to train the parents on 
the operation of the heart/breath monitor, it immediately became clear that the parents were not 
capable of providing the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or other care necessary for 
her physical, mental and emotional health and development. This parental unfitness caused the 
continued out of home placement and must be considered in an analysis of 78-3a-407(4) along 
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G. The court concludes that while parental rights are constitutionally protected, the 
legislature is not prevented from altering the statutory grounds for termination. Protecting 
children and providing permanency for them are compelling state interests. The addition of 
Section (4), (5), and (6) to 78-3a-407 was within the province of the legislature to do, and these 
subsections are not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore are not unconstitutional. 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
A. After consideration of the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child, the 
efforts that the parents have made to adjust to make it in the child's best interest to return home 
within a reasonable time, the lack of regular visitation and the failure to maintain regular contact 
and communication, the court concludes that it is in the best interest of this child that the 
parent/child relationship between her and her natural parents be terminated. 
B. The child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that her familial 
identity is with that family. The foster family is able and willing to permanently treat the child 
as a member of the family. There exists a love, affection and other emotional ties between the 
child and the foster parents which does not exist/between the child and the parents. The capacity 
and disposition of the foster parents to give the child love, affection and guidance and to continue 
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5. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(2), this order does not disentitle the Child 
to any benefit due her from any third person, including, but not limited to, any Indian tribe, 
agency, state, or the United States. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(3), the parents shall forthwith neither be 
entitled to any notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child nor shall have any right to object 
to the adoption or to participate in any other placement proceedings. 
7. In accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-412, a review of this matter, including 
the dispositional phase of this matter, shall be held within 90 days. 
DATED this ^ day of ^ W H ^ I , 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
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